San Jose Short Sale Agent: Silicon Valley Foreclosure Prevention Specialists

I get upset when people don’t try their best.  I realize everyone is different and has different personalities, but we, as Realtors, are all in the business of representing the best interests of our clients.  As Realtors, we have a fiduciary duty to our clients: this means we are to put client’s interest ahead of our own.  We must do our best for our clients.  I’ve heard too many Realtors cave into the lenders without putting up much of a fight.

With the economy still in its anemic state and unemployment level still hovering near historic high of 10% (11.5% here in Silicon Valley), the prospect of depleting the inventory of distressed properties in the immediate future does not seem feasible.  The high level of unemployment and implementation of HAFA with the support of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac means the next few years will be busy years for short sale.

If, you therefore, choose to make a living helping distressed homeowners fight foreclosures, then by all means go out and fight for them because they need all the assistance you can provide.  This often time means pushing on even when the lenders say no or put up road blocks in your path.  The negotiators working for lenders are not highly compensated and are often over-worked, so they simply do not care and are often willing to send homeowners into foreclosure because of minor technicalities.  Some will help out homeowners by going out of their way to help your clients, most will not.  It’s the nature of the bureaucratic systems in which they work.  It doesn’t mean they are bad people, it just means there is little or no incentive for them to go out beyond what is expected of them.  So it is up to us, the Realtors to step up and earn our commissions.

As a San Jose Short Sale Agent, I recently received a call from an attorney friend of mine who wanted me to help his client because the East Coast lender/servicer denied their loan modification request and would not agree to extend a trustee sale which was scheduled some three weeks out.   He got tired of dealing with this lender and wanted to know if I could get the sale date extended and complete a short sale.  Three weeks to stop a foreclosure was a tall order, but I thought I could help.

Getting a bona fide buyer took longer than I anticipated and we had only one week left before the scheduled trustee sale.  I immediately contacted the lender to advise them we had a solid offer and that I had just submitted a short sale packet.  The curt response I got was that their investor had a policy not to extend Trustee sales unless the short sale packets were submitted at least 10 days prior to the sale date: I was three days too late. She would not even consider looking at the offer or the packet. 

I had worked too hard during the past two weeks to simply be told that due to some arbitrary deadline; my clients were going to be thrown out in the street when we had a perfectly good buyer wanting to purchase their home.   I escalated the matter to the negotiator’s supervisor.  She simply reiterated their investor’s policy and told me there was nothing she could do.  I wasn’t going to be stopped by these bureaucrats who didn’t want to lift a finger.  I searched the internet and found the Corporate Communication Director’s contact information.  This time, I was going to use my ace card: my client’s hardship was his wife’s cancer. While she was receiving treatment, she eventually lost her job and the second income which was required to meet their mortgage obligations.

By the time I got the number and the email address (they are in the East Coast), the office was closed, but I left a voicemail and sent an email explaining my situation and that I would contact the local media and explain that the big East Coast lender, because of an arbitrary deadline and because it was inconvenient, would rather throw a cancer victim out into the street, even where there is a willing bona fide buyer, because we missed an arbitrary deadline by three days!   I was not going to let my clients get thrown out into the streets when we had a willing buyer.

The following afternoon, I got a call from the executive office.   They were more receptive and cooperative then the loss mitigation department employees.  The helpful woman said she would get in touch with the appropriate person at the loss mitigation department and do everything she could to get an extension on the sale date.

The next day, I got a call from someone who was a VP at loss mitigation, she began to tell me that the sale date could not be extended because it was the investor’s policy and therefore, they could not deviate from it and began to tell me all the reasons why her hands were tied.  This was a completely different response than the woman from the executive office.

I wasn’t going to simply accept her explanation, I simply would not accept that they had zero influence in extending the trustee sale; I didn’t fall off a turnip truck yesterday.  I called the executive office and again threatened to call the local consumer affairs reporter.  This time the helpful lady told me to disregard what I was told by the loss mitigation employee because she was going to pull strings and get it done.  She asked me to trust her and to call the attorney service the next day and confirm for myself that the extension was granted.  I had no choice as we were down to four days before the sale date.  I called the attorney service the next morning and got the news I was waiting for: we received a 60 days extension.

Between the attorney friend and myself, we were told on four different occasions that the trustee sale could not be extended.  They were simply refusing to lift their fingers to help out the borrower.  I had no choice but to refuse to accept their answers because doing so  would mean that my clients would literally be thrown out into the street when we had a willing buyer to take their home.   I was not proud of exploiting my client’s cancer condition, but I had to protect their interest by any means necessary.  In the end we persevered because I refused to listen to them when they told me no.   I guess I am hard headed in that way; but my clients are thankful and that is good enough for me.

This important legislation (SB 1178) passed the California State Assembly and is now heading to Gov. Schwarzenegger’s desk for his signature before it becomes law.   This particular legislation is immensely important during these economically difficult times where homeowners are often facing foreclosure.

This legislation attempts to protect homeowners who, in an effort to obtain lower interest rates through re-financing their loans, lost an important legal protection that limited the lenders to no more than the collateralized property during the foreclosure process. The loss of this protection essentially gave the lending institutions a second bite at the homeowners; not only were they able to take their homes through foreclosure, but they reserved their right to come after the homeowners for the full deficiency value between what was borrowed and what the property eventually sold  for.   The fact that the lenders would not take into consideration the depreciated market value of the property was an additional slap on the face to the distressed and now homeless borrowers.

As a matter of clarification, it is important to point out that this legislation protects the status of those who re-financed their purchase money loan to obtain lower rates.  It DOES NOT protect those homeowners who obtain cash-out loans and do other things like pay down credit cards or start businesses; activities unrelated to the purchase or maintenance of their homes.

As a San Jose Short Sale Agent, I see this heart-breaking scenario more than I care to mention.  Homeowners who simply wanted to lower their interest rates find out during the foreclosure process that they had given up this incredibly important anti-deficiency protection; a protection they certainly would not have given up had they been made aware that a re-finance would trigger said loss.   This is one of those legislations that is the right thing to do.

But that appears to be good news as that number is an improvement over from the past quarter.    However, that is not the full story…..

“But don’t cheer about the slight gains in the past three months. Most of the improvement comes because so many people lost their homes to foreclosure “

The twin pillars of destruction in the real estate market still remain: high unemployment and negative equity.  As long as the homeowners do not see the light at the end of the tunnel, they will be more inclined to walk away from their homes.

http://money.cnn.com/2010/08/09/real_estate/fewer_underwater_borrowers/index.htm

I get a lot of questions posed to me about short sale and foreclosures. An interesting one was posed to me recently.  “How much will a foreclosure cost me?”

I had to really think about this question.  Sure the standard answer about the difference in being able to obtain a loan in the future with Fannie Mae being 2 years vs. 5 years and the FICO score dropping by up to 250 points came to mind.  However, I was thinking that question was asking for a quantifiable number.  How could I quantify the cost of a foreclosure?

I spoke with my loan broker and decided to see what the actual cost would be by comparing someone obtaining a loan pre-foreclosure and then post-foreclosure.

Let us assume an individual has a FICO score of 750 and wants to buy a home for $500,000 with 20% down; so he would be borrowing $400,000.  By running the FICO score through the Fannie Mae guidelines, this individual can obtain a 30 year fixed loan at 4.735 % and have a monthly mortgage payment of $1,997 as of 7/15/2010.

Let’s assume that same individual had gone trough a foreclosure and had taken a 250 point hit on his FICO score.  What would the “cost difference” be for him if he wanted to obtain a loan to buy a house today?

First, any individual with less than a FICO score of 620 cannot qualify to borrow from traditional lenders; the only option available to such a person would be the hard money arena or private lenders.

Private lenders require down payments of 20% , but more like 30-40% .  They are also short term loans, so you would only be able to borrow for 5 years or less, you would have to make other arrangements after that point or build up your FICO to the point where you would be able to qualify for a traditional loan.  But for easy comparison’s sake, we will ignore those two important facts, since there is no other alternative funding method. Let’s assume an individual is able to qualify for a loan of $400,000 after a foreclosure.

After checking with one of her private money lenders, my loan broker came back and told me a private money lender would charge 10% to lend $400,000.   The monthly payment on that loan would be $3,510!

How much will a foreclosure cost?  About $1,510 per month, by my calculations.

Please don’t write to me, pointing out all the errors in my unscientific reasoning.  This was a simplistic exercise trying to somehow quantify the damage to visualize the loss a person may suffer.

Some good news about the effects of HAFA on California Foreclosures.

The general perception is that the people who are not paying their mortgages are either unemployed or are the common man who is going through a rough time.   This headline, however, paints a bit of a different picture: it is the borrower of  loans that are over a Million Dollar who are defaulting at a higher rate than the borrowers below a Million Dollars.  One in Seven for the Million Dollar borrower versus one in twelve for the other borrower.

The talk of the moment right now is that of strategic default.  And the interesting thing is that this article raises the question as to whether the rich are making strategic financial decisions to stop paying their mortgage as bad investments.   That certainly would explain why the segment with the higher net worth and other resources are defaulting at a higher rate that the less fortunate segment of society.

It would be interesting to see how this pans out.

The increase in short sales is self-evident in any MLS system around the country as the number of homeowners who are unable to qualify for loan modifications and do not want to be forced into foreclosures seek out a better alternative.  Foreclosure or short sale?  The choice is obvious.

Freddie Mac CEO Ed Haldeman announced the number of its short sales increase by 600% from 2008!  An increase was certainly obvious, but 600%?   And with HAFA still ramping up, that number is sure to increase in the near future.

In a statement put out this week, Haldeman said Freddie Mac is doing everything it can to prevent more foreclosures, and that short sales are becoming an ever-popular tool in situations where foreclosure is imminent and modifications have failed.

The rationale behind this increase in foreclosure is, again, obvious for distressed homeowners.

“Foreclosure alternatives like short sales and deeds-in-lieu help borrowers to avoid the stigma of foreclosure, shorten the waiting period before they can buy a new home, and may inflict less damage on their credit reports,” Haldeman said.

He added that these alternatives are also helpful to lenders and insurers. Citing several independent studies, Haldeman said banks lose more than $50,000 per foreclosed home or as much as 30-to-60% of the outstanding mortgage.

You don’t need media reports like these to know that short sales are increasing dramatically, just ask your local realtor who handles a lot of short sales whether their short sale volume is increasing.

Today, Fannie Mae announced how it would deal with strategic defaulters: they will be punished by being unable to qualify for a loan for up to 7 years through Fannie Mae and the latter will reserve the right to take legal action to recoup the losses in states that permit deficiency judgments (not the case in California).  The line has been drawn in the sand.

Strategic defaulters, or those borrowers who have the financial ability to pay their mortgages but who choose not to and walk away because the value of their homes are underwater, are becoming a big problem for banks as the stigma is becoming less and less meaningful and the distressed properties market is ever increasing.   One study puts strategic default at 1/3 of all defaults which eventually lead to foreclosures.

Fannie Mae is addressing a big problem for itself and trying to force strategic defaulters to think twice before walking away from their mortgage obligations.  It’s a perfectly understandable move on its part as it is trying to do potential future damage control.   This reason is also why it has agreed to participate in the HAFA program guideline to encourage negotiated and approved short sales rather than have homeowners simply walk away. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have figured out it is better to work with the distressed borrowers and, for those who qualify, work out an agreed short sale resolution rather than have the property foreclose, as the loss to them will be significantly greater in the end. They are simply engaging in good business practices by mitigating their loss.

People often talk of the Shadow Inventory, that mysterious excess capacity of homes that will hit the foreclosure market, but is currently in limbo and have not hit the foreclosure market for whatever reason.  There is the usual speculation ranging  from it being the result of  large banks controlling the flow of foreclosure inventory to protect their assets to conspiracy theorists who think the Government is behind it.  But how do you measure it?

Well, economists at Morgan Stanley included the inventory of homes will eventually need to be processed through the REO process, including those that are going through HAMP and HAFA right now.   While others just measure those that are 90 days delinquent in their mortgage payments.  However you measure it, there is a lot of interest in trying it quantify the size of the Shadow Inventory.

Different bloggers and journalists have written about and speculated as to the size of this Shadow Inventory.   This week, Morgan Stanley took on the task and reached the conclusion that it would take up to 4 years to clear the Shadow Inventory. The number of homes were calculated at 8 Million.

Is this assessment accurate or inaccurate?  Who knows. Capital Economics did their own analysis and came to the conclusion that 5.5 Million homes (short of  3 years to deplete)  would fall into the Shadow Inventory.   Regardless  of whose numbers you choose to believe, it is very large at between 3 – 4 years.   It looks like we will have a few more years of having to deal with distressed properties.

Ask anyone who does a lot of short sales about what is becoming a troubling trend in the industry and my guess is a majority of them will bring up the fact that the junior lien holder (or the second mortgage) is refusing to cooperate and demanding unreasonable amounts of money for them to agree to a short sale; or some of them even asking for illegal kickbacks in the form of payments made without being disclosed on the HUD1.

What does all of this mean?  Well, the junior liens have been receiving pennies out of the dollar, sometimes getting paid $3,000 on a loan with a balance of $100,000.  Yes, the loss is huge, but the junior lien holder has very little alternative, as a foreclosure means their loan is wiped out.  Hence, the senior loans have been successful in pressuring the juniors to take the lesser of the two evils, pennies or nothing.

Many junior lien holders are not taking this lying down now.  They have figured out they can combat the pressure from the senior liens by refusing to agree to the short sale. They are holding out until they can negotiate better terms.  They are simply saying to the senior lien holders: “if we don’t get a better offer, we won’t let the short sale happen; you will be forced to into foreclosure and your net will be much lower in a foreclosure sale than a short sale.”  They are simply playing a game of chicken.  Remember, if there are two loans in a short sale, both of the lien holders have to agree to permit the sale to proceed.

Or the other tactic is, some junior liens are demanding that the sellers pay them a settlement fee outside of escrow so that it will not show up on the HUD1.  A HUD1 discloses to all parties who is getting paid what.  By making a payment outside of the HUD1, the junior lien holder is getting paid without the senior lien holder finding out.  This is illegal, by the way; mortgage fraud, a Federal Offense from what I am told.

We all understand what the junior lien holder is trying to accomplish, but the problem is that in their game of chicken, the majority of the parties are suffering. We have one party who wants the property; the other party who wants to sell and move on with their lives and get out from under the banks; the senior lien holder who is also taking a huge loss, but because the junior lien holder, who knows they can get nothing if they force the transaction into foreclosure is hell-bent on forcing a foreclosure because they want to get a little bit more: even by illegal means.  They pressure the sellers to such an extent, the sellers are sometimes choosing to accept foreclosure rather than to give into what is being demanded.   Remember, the collective goal right now for the country is to reduce foreclosures, not to encourage it.

Because this problem is becoming more common and have reached critical mass, Barney Frank, the Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee has sent out a petition to the largest banks to voluntarily take action to permit second lien write downs; or else.

The same banks who are junior lien holders are also senior lien holders on other loans, so in the grand scheme of things, they will benefit if they prevent foreclosures.  So what are these guys  doing?  They are hurting their own bottom line and taking everyone else down with them; it makes no sense.